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The spread of communications technology may facilitate
increases in levels of anti-government violence
 Communications technology has developed at an almost bewildering pace since the development of the internet,
with first mobiles and then smartphones ensuring that we are in near constant contact with our peers. But what
impact has this had on violence, and more specifically anti-government violence. Blake E. Garcia and Cameron
Wimpy argue that there is a correlation between access to communications technology and aggression directed
at the state and its proxies. 
The spread of violence across
state boundaries has been a long-
standing concern for democratic
governments. Justifications for
international military interventions
often involve the stated mission to
prevent the spread of violence
into neighbouring states and even
economic development aid is
often contingent upon such
prevention. Although there is
strong empirical evidence that
many forms of violence (e.g civil
wars, domestic armed conflicts,
terrorism, riots, etc.) do spread
into neighbouring states, how this
process occurs is still unclear.
One explanation argues that
large-scale conflicts tend to
generate significant refugee populations, who flee into neighbouring states. This can intensify resource
competition as well as already existing ethnic frustrations, leading to the spread of conflict. A second explanation
suggests that upon learning from their observation of a successful rebellion in a neighbouring country, individuals
are more likely to emulate those actions to achieve a similar outcome at home.
While both arguments are compelling, the first cannot explain the spread of different types of violence that we
regularly observe, such as anti-government violence, riots, and terrorism. Civil wars tend to produce refugees
while other, often less intense forms of violence do not. The second explanation assumes that actors within one
country are always more likely to be aware of the violent events occurring in their neighbor, rather than some
more distant state, simply because they share a border. Thus, empirical tests attempting to capture spatial
dependence in violence do not incorporate the variation in actors’ awareness of neighbouring events, thereby
potentially overestimating the degree of dependence.
We argue that in order to emulate violent events in neighboring countries, actors must become aware of these
events through their exposure to information about them. We believe that increased communications capacities in
neighboring states should therefore help to facilitate the extent to which the neighboring publics emulate the
violent actions of their neighbors.
This idea is not new. For example, a substantial amount of political commentary during the Arab Spring
speculated about the role of social media in the spread of anti-government violence across northern Africa. We
believe that this might be a more generally occurring process in less developed states where there is greater
variation in access to communications capacities.
In a forthcoming article in the journal, Political Science Research and Methods, we tested the claim that increased
access to communications technologies facilitate the spread of anti-government violence in an analysis of 44
African countries from 2000 to 2011. We utilised a unique spatial connectivity matrix that incorporated measures
of state contiguity and access to communications technology. We found that when anti-government violence
increased in one country, the expected number of violent events in its neighbours increased by 32 percent as the
percentage of cell phone subscribers moved from its mean level to one standard deviation above the mean (27
percent to 57 percent of the population).
In addition, the expected number of violent events increased by 18.9 percent when the percentage of internet
users increased by one standard deviation above the mean (4.49 percent to 11.23 percent of the population). In
other words, greater access to communications technologies can, in fact, facilitate the spread of anti-government
violence, which has potentially significant implications for democratic governments that are providing economic
development aid to less developed countries.
The U.K. government, for example, spent over £10 billion last year alone in foreign economic aid, much of which
went to countries included in the study presented here. This aid is often spent on development projects that
include the building of mobile phone towers, wireless internet connection, and other forms of advanced
communication technology. The concern then in the short term is that this aid will indirectly help to facilitate the
spread of violence.
However, in the long term, it appears that higher degrees of access to this technology may be correlated with
democratic institutional features that reduce the likelihood of the spread of violence. Indeed, our research shows
that the spread of violence actually dissipates at significantly higher levels of mobile phone and internet usage.
This might mean that our findings appear to apply only to changes in usage at already particularly low levels.
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